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ABSTRACT: Apartheid ideology presents traditional historiography with a 
series of conundrums: the difficulty of separating historical from subjective 
agency; the paradoxical status of ideologues who both author ideology and 
yet are nonetheless also subject to the spread of its ideas; the issue of the 
non-material benefits which appear to drive its ideological system. Taking as 
its starting-point J.M. Coetzee’s (1991) reflections on these issues, this paper 
builds on his promising intuition of the notion of ‘fantasmatic rewards’ as a 
crucial explanatory element in understanding the ‘mind of apartheid’. Crucial 
in this respect are a number of Lacanian concepts (desire, the Other, fantasy, 
objet petit a, alienation and separation). Recourse to these notions enables us 
to provide a series of responses to the above dilemmas of apartheid ideology. 
Such concepts, moreover, arguably do greater conceptual justice to the inter-
implication of Other and subject, that is, to the inter-implication of the trans-
subjective socio-historical substance and unconscious subjectivity. 
 
Keywords: Lacanian psychoanalysis, apartheid, ideology, racism, desire, 
Other, agency, alienation, separation, fantasy, objet petit a, fantasmatic 
rewards, unconscious subjectivity. 
 
Introduction 
The historical analysis of racist ideology – and that of apartheid in particular – 
presents traditional historiography with a series of conundrums. There is the 
problem of how to conceptualize the role of madness in history, the issue, that 
is to say, of how rationalist frameworks of explanation grapple with the 
fantasmatic dimension of racism, and the related question of how materialist 
approaches understand racism’s non-material rewards. Additionally, there are 
a series of subsidiary considerations of crucial importance in understanding 
the functioning of apartheid ideology: the difficulty of separating historical from 
subjective agency; the paradoxical status of ideologues who both author 
ideology and yet are nonetheless also subject to its spread of its ideas; and 
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the issues of what non-material benefits appear to drive the ideological 
system. These are not new problems; they have in fact been expertly 
elucidated in an article by the author J.M. Coetzee, which I have taken as a 
touchstone for the current paper, a vehicle for introducing and dramatizing a 
series of quandaries of ideology to which I think Lacanian theory offers an 
important set of responses.  
A Lacanian standpoint is clearly not one that doubts the centrality of 
desire when it comes to issues of subjectivity. It likewise does not shy away 
from the complexities and ambiguities evident in the subject-Other (or subject-
Structure) relation. These Lacanian perspectives make for crucial analytical 
resources - as I hope shortly to demonstrate - and they certainly support the 
argument that a Lacanian frame of analysis enables us to conceptualize the 
transactions underlying the operation of apartheid ideology. My objective here 
is modest, not to carry out any sustained empirical analysis but simply to 
connect a particular facet of Lacanian theory to the dilemmas Coetzee 
highlights. More specifically, my intent is to make the case for Lacan’s notions 
of fantasy, the big Other, the objet petit a and the aligned processes of 
alienation and separation as vital conceptual instruments through which to 
approach the explanatory dilemmas mentioned above.  
 
Lacanian desire  
Desire for Spinoza, as Lacan reminds us in the final pages of Seminar XI, The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, is “the essence of man” 
(1979, p. 275). Now while this is not strictly Lacan’s position – the 
presumption of any such subjective essence is anathema to his concerns – it 
does nonetheless give us a flavour of his concerns in Seminar XI, and a 
sense of where a Lacanian mode of analysis might begin. Desire for Lacan is 
linked to questions of being, and it retains always a relation to that which the 
subject is lacking. To refer to Stavrakakis, “socially conditioned desire 
constitutes the alienated, ‘extimate’…(‘externally intimate’)…essence of our 
reality” (p. 47). This, desire, is what psychoanalysis must attempt to read; it is 
what a Lacanian analytics must attempt to follow. 
 We can relate this issue of desire – which is always sustained and 
shaped by fantasy, for fantasy tells me what I desire - to a fundamental 
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pattern, or perhaps structure of questioning: “What does the Other want?” I 
say ‘structure’ here to emphasize that despite countless performative 
variations and innumerable differences of situation and spoken content, there 
is nonetheless a basic type of appeal, and a single addressee in question. 
The period of early childhood provides us with a context for the emergence of 
such a mode of questioning. “What does she (the mother) want?” provides us 
with perhaps the most elementary form of this questioning, or, in a way which 
better lends itself to adaptations of behaviour: “How can I be what she 
wants?”, “How can I incarnate within myself that which embodies her desire?” 
Something like a riddle of desire emerges here: I desire to be that which she 
desires and in this way I myself come to desire. Bruce Fink puts this well: “in 
the child’s attempt to grasp what remains essentially indecipherable in the 
Other’s desire…the child’s own desire is founded; the Other’s desire begins to 
function as the cause of the child’s desire” (1995, p. 59). Or, to draw on 
Žižek’s (1996) discussion of the implications of Lacan’s “Desire is the desire 
of the Other”: 
First, there is the dialectic of recognition in which the other’s desire 
is the object of my desire: what I desire is to be desired – 
recognized by the other (‘the first object of desire is to be 
recognized by the other’). Secondly, ‘it is qua Other that he [the 
subject] desires – that is, what I desire is predetermined and 
decided at the Other Place of the anonymous-transsubjective 
symbolic order, it is ‘mediated’ by the symbolic network of the 
cultural tradition to which I belong” (p. 167). 
The threefold implication of the above state of affairs is worth reiterating: an 
Other’s desire causes mine, it ignites my desire, sets it in motion, firstly; this 
desire becomes what I want to be inasmuch as I want to be this object of 
desire, secondly; I come to desire the same things as this desiring Other, I am 
similarly located in the social field of desires, I take on their ‘perspective of 
desire’, thirdly. Already then we have the indication that the subject’s relation 
to desire and to the Other’s desire – crucial to the problems of ideology to 
which we will shortly turn – is of considerable complexity. 
The child’s eventual realization is that the goal of personifying the 
mother’s desire is futile. This desire is neither static nor unchanging, it proves 
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to be always in excess of the child, out of their reach, headed elsewhere. The 
child thus must come to understand themselves as lacking, inadequate to the 
task of embodying this desire. Moreover – and this is the moment which 
heralds the possibility of a type of separation from the Other – the child 
glimpses that the mother is also lacking; she must be, because she is marked 
by desire, she is not complete, she desires something that exceeds her. This 
is the difficulty that plagues the pattern of questioning mentioned above: the 
issue of my desire remains always contingent on an Other, on the question of 
what this Other desires which is always somewhat enigmatic, something 
beyond the subject, and, indeed importantly, beyond the Other themselves 
also. We have two types of lack then, and a situation in which what is 
essential to the subject - the question of their desire - is continually stretched 
out, moving along this circuit of questioning (“What does the Other want?”, 
“What do I want?”, “Well, what does the Other want?”) that joins two barred 
positions.  
It would be a mistake to assume that a kind of balance of lacks exists 
here. “The relation of the subject to the Other is entirely produced in a process 
of gap” advances Lacan (1979, p. 206). The questioning engagement 
between the subject and Other is circular in the sense, as Lacan puts it, of 
“from the subject called to the Other, to the subject of that which he has 
himself seen appear in the field of the Other, from the Other coming back” (p. 
207). This circularity does not imply a two-way process, it is “circular, but, of 
its nature, without reciprocity. Because it is circular, it is dissymmetrical (1979, 
p. 207). 
 
The ‘Che vuoi?’ formula: alienation in the Other 
The continual movement of such a circuit of questioning and undecided 
answers – what we might liken to a transaction of desire – is not limited to 
childhood. This pattern of questioning, this metonymic movement across an 
endless chain of signifiers, is characteristic of human desire as such. Desire is 
always caught up in a series of appeals to the Other, that is, to that hovering 
interlocutor to whom all of my social actions and meanings are inevitably 
addressed, that principle of intelligibility that makes social meaning and 
communicative inter-subjectivity possible.  
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It is not difficult to improvise a set of variations on this “Che vuoi?” 
(“What do you want?”) repetitively posed entreaty to the Other: “What am I to 
you?”, “What must I be?”, or in the melodrama of a lover’s quarrel “What do 
you want from me?”. This attempt of the subject to locate themselves relative 
to the question of the Other’s desire is destined to constant failure. If it might 
be said to succeed at all, this success is at best momentary, a flickering event 
which is quickly tipped over into doubt. We are left with a picture of the 
perpetual motion-machine of desire as it operates in the human subject: an 
incessant querying of the Other’s desire; the assumption of a hypothetical 
answer gleaned from their gestures and actions; a gradual wearing thin of this 
hypothesis as inadequate; and then, once again: a renewed querying of the 
Other’s desire…  
There is something hysterical in this line of questioning – in this ‘Che 
vuoi?’ formula, which, as Žižek (1989) insists, occurs everywhere within the 
political domain - inasmuch as no solicited answer will ever be adequate. We 
are dealing with a bottomless succession of questions; to every answer given 
(“This is what you are…”, “This is what is demanded of you”, “This is what I 
want…”) there is inevitable riposte: “But why?”, “What lies behind what you 
have told me?”, “What is the real reasons you have said this?” Lacan 
describes this incessant questioning as it occurs in the ‘why?’ of the child, 
relating it both to the structural incompleteness of discourse and to the child’s 
preoccupation with what their role is, their importance, their place in the 
scheme of things: 
A lack is encountered by the subject in the Other, in the very 
intimation that the Other makes to him by his discourse. In the 
intervals of the discourse of the Other, there emerges in the 
experience of the child something…namely, He is saying this to 
me, but what does he want? ...The desire of the Other is 
apprehended by the subject…in the lacks of the discourse of the 
Other, and all the child’s whys reveal not so much an avidity for the 
reason of things, as a testing of the adult, a Why are you telling me 
this? ever-resuscitated from its base, which is the enigma of the 
adult’s desire (1979, p. 214). 
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This situation is thus more complicated than it may have at first appeared: not 
only is the question of my desire impossibly entangled in the Other, so is the 
issue of my social being, of my status, my purpose, my location, of what I am 
to others. The desire of the Other – that, in other words, of the trans-
subjective symbolic order – is crucial to any attempt to form an identity within 
my given community, within the socio-historical and discursive co-ordinates 
within which I find myself.  
To recap: we have introduced the notion of a ‘structure’ of questioning 
that is the necessary outcome of a fundamental ‘lack of fit’ – a result of the 
fact that our own desire remains unfixable, brought into being by and tethered 
to the desire of an Other we can never fully know. We have outlined also the 
related dilemma according to which we are never wholly accommodated 
within our socio-symbolic positions. To appreciate this dilemma is to 
understand the pattern of constant recourse to an Other who is thought not 
only to hold an answer crucial to my being (the answer of desire, of “What do I 
want?”) but to provide the very co-ordinates of my identity (of what I am, and 
why). Once we realize that the linked questions of desire (“What do I want?”) 
and of social location (“What makes sense of the position I occupy in 
society?”) are really unanswerable – for they always rebound in the form of 
another question – then we start to understand the futility of such recourse to 
the Other, at least within the realm of the signifier, and the alienation of the 
subject that inevitably results. 
 
Separation: An overlapping of lacks 
The notion of alienation within Lacan is often associated, as a matter of 
course, with the mirror-phase and the Imaginary, the domain of image and 
identification. What should be clear from the above line of discussion is that to 
this mode of alienation we need add another: the alienation of the subject 
within the realm of the signifier. As Jacqueline Rose (1996) puts it, the subject 
first identifies with the signifier (in the misrecognitions of the mirror stage) and 
then is determined by the signifier (in the attempt to express and formulate 
their desire within the symbolic). The latter is something Lacan never tires of 
affirming. In Seminar XI he declares: “The Other is the locus in which is 
situated the chain of the signifier that governs whatever may be made…of the 
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subject” (1979, p. 203). Not only must we appreciate “the constitution of the 
subject in the field of the Other”, we must understand that “the characteristic 
of this subject of the unconscious is that of being, beneath the signifier that 
develops its networks, its chains and its history, at an indeterminate place” (p. 
208).  It is perhaps necessary to provide a brief précis of the alienation in the 
signifier that Lacan has in mind here, an outline of the fact that in submitting to 
the Other, the subject assumes the ‘out of jointness’, the divided existence, of 
subservience to the signifier. 
 This mode of alienation is famously described by Lacan in Seminar XI 
as a vel, an either/or forced choice, like the highway man’s “money or your 
life”. The vel of alienation, more specifically, presents the subject with the 
‘non-choice’ of being (an existence outside the domain of the signifier) and 
meaning (existence within the jurisdiction of the signifier and the Other). I say 
‘non-choice’, because to chose being is to fall into non-meaning, which is an 
effective inexistence. Then again – and this is the pertinence of the highway 
man’s threat - to chose meaning is to be “eclipsed by the disappearance of 
being, induced by the…function of the signifier” (Lacan, 1979, p. 211), another 
form of inexistence.   
As inescapable as alienation appears to be, it does not account for the 
entirety of the subject’s relation to the Other. This relation is also one 
characterized by separation. This is regarded as one of the key achievements 
of Seminar XI, Lacan’s theorization of this twin relationship: 
Alienation and separation are linked…they install the subject in a 
never ending pulsating process of appearing and disappearing. 
Alienation takes the subject away from being, in the direction of the 
Other. Separation is the opposite process, inasmuch as it redirects 
the subject towards its being, thus opening a possibility of escape 
from all-determining alienation, and even a possibility of choice, 
albeit a precarious one (Verhaeghe, 1999, p. 180).  
Mladen Dolar (1988) is equally helpful here: if alienation excludes the 
choice of being and the loss of subjectivity – alienation, to reiterate, as a result 
of the operation of the signifier, in the field of the Other – then the process of 
separation seems to force the subject “to assume precisely that which was 
excluded: to present itself as the object of the desire of the Other, an object to 
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fill its lack” (p. 24). 1 If the Other were no more than a closed structure, then 
the subject’s destiny would be one of inescapable alienation. Hence the 
importance of Lacan’s theorization of separation - or ‘dis-alienation’ as it is 
sometimes understood – as a counterpoint to the alienation in language. This 
is crucial inasmuch as the subject, and indeed, subjectivity within Lacanian 
theory is not simply the determined result of structure. In this respect we may 
refer back to the infant-relationship: there must here be some possibility of 
differentiation from the mother, a strict identity cannot be maintained between 
mother’s and child’s desire, a gap or sorts must open. As I have implied 
above, there is a point of realization in which the subject grasps that the 
Other, like themselves, is also missing something, is also characterized by a 
‘not having’, a lack. The moment of respite represented by separation 
provides the subject a window of sorts “it enables him to avoid total alienation 
in the signifier not by filling out his lack but by allowing him to identify himself, 
his own lack, with the lack in the Other (Žižek, 1989, p. 122). 
This means then that there are two dimensions to the Other. This is 
imperative if one is to see beyond the seeming inevitability of alienation: the 
Other is not only the treasury of signifiers, it is also lacking, a site 
characterized by a certain desire. It is this other function of the Other that 
makes separation possible. Soler (1995) makes this very clear: in separation 
we are dealing with “another aspect of the Other, not the Other full of 
signifiers [evident in alienation] but…the Other in which something is lacking” 
(p. 49). Homer (2005) extends this idea, emphasizing that separation is linked 
to desire, that it designates the process through which the child differentiates 
itself from the m(O)ther and is hence not simply a subject of language. 
Separation, he notes, “takes place in the domain of desire and requires from 
the subject a certain ‘want to be’”, this is a ‘want to be’ which, crucially, is 
“separate from the signifying chain” (p. 72). 
A fundamental facet of separation is a coincidence of lacks, and 
furthermore – again a sense of circularity, the evocation of a one-way 
repeated transaction between subject and Other – the fact that the subject 
attempts to offer an answer to the lack of the Other, responding to it with his 
or her own lack. The desire of the Other, notes Dolar, presents a question – 
“What does he want?” – a question inevitably  
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countered by another question – do I possess what he wants? 
What is it in me that could possibly satisfy this desire? So the 
subject is ultimately put in a position of offering not only what s/he 
has, but essentially what s/he doesn’t possess – and this is 
precisely Lacan’s definition of love…“to give what one doesn’t 
have” (1998, p. 24). 
This transaction between subject and Other, this loving response of the 
subject in a circular non-reciprocal pattern of questioning, is well rendered by 
Verhaeghe. He reiterates that the inconsistency of the Other “is answered by 
a presentation of the lack at the anterior level”, namely that of the subject’s 
own disappearance, “[h]ence the non-reciprocity and dissymmetry, by which 
the process topples over into the direction of alienation again (1999, p. 181). 
We have thus a useful corrective to the idea that separation simply 
transcends, overcomes the everyday dialectics of alienation. Equally evident 
here is an emphasis on the fleeting nature of this moment, of the void which 
opens up between subject and Object, thus allowing the possibility of an 
escape from the determinism of the signifying chain, even despite the fact that 
it typically collapses back into a state of alienation. In contradistinction then to 
the ‘this or that’ forced-choice between meaning and being in alienation, the 
operation of separation is presented as a neither/nor. So, by contrast to the 
process of alienation, the neither/nor of separation does give rise to a viable 
form of being, although this being is of a profoundly transient and elusive sort, 
as implied in Fink’s (1995)  descriptions of the Lacanian subject as pulse-like 
movement, a momentary flash between being and meaning. 
 
The radical problem of desire 
Something is enabled in the opening of this rift, a fact implied by Lacan’s 
toying with the term for separation (se parere), which, again drawing on 
Verhaeghe (1999), means at once to defend, to dress, to engender oneself. 
What emerges from this neither/nor situation of separation where both subject 
and Other are eclipsed (neither being able to claim that they “have it”) is the 
object of fantasy, the object-cause of desire, the Lacanian objet petit a.  Objet 
a for Fink (1995) is the remainder of the hypothetical mother-child (subject-
Other) unity, the last trace and reminder of this posited overlap of desires: 
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By cleaving to this rem(a)inder, the split subject, though expulsed 
from the Other, can sustain the illusion of wholeness; by clinging to 
[objet a], the subject is able to ignore his or her division (p. 59). 
Not only his or her division, we might add, but that of the social order itself; 
objet a is the reparative object, posited by the subject, as a means of 
responding to both such lacks. In more basic terms: this object of fantasy, this 
object-cause of desire, is generated in response to the double lack of subject 
and Other. It is the result of the subject’s attempt to retrieve a scrap of an 
illusory subject-Other wholeness; this objet a, forever fascinating, arousing, 
will sustain the subject in being, as a being of desire.  
With the objet a we are dealing with what Žižek (2000) terms the 
subject’s ‘objectal counterpart’ that is put to work as means of covering the 
lack in the Other. Its paradoxical status is thus already clear: it belongs wholly 
neither to the subject or the Other. It is, as we might put it, the convexity of the 
subject’s lack, but given that it functions to paper-over the Other’s lack – and 
so to fantasmatically restore them - it may equally be said to be the convexity 
of the Other’s lack, that which grants it a degree of consistency, lends it a 
semblance of wholeness, integration. We may provide a further gloss on this 
process of separation, on the outcome of this coincidence of two lacks, which 
as Dolar (1998) insists – and here it is worth quoting him at length - 
produces something:…the object of desire, which appears 
precisely where the two lacks coincide – the lack of the subject and 
the lack of the Other. There is an object involved on both sides, 
figuring as a pivotal point of fantasy – the object “within the subject” 
that one tries to present in order to fill the lack in the Other, to deal 
with its desire; and on the other hand, the object “within the Other,” 
its surmised surplus, the source of its unfathomable jouissance, the 
secret clue as to what makes the Other enjoy and that one wants to 
partake of. Ultimately, what makes the Other the Other, what 
makes it unfathomable, is what appears in its lack, an object 
heterogeneous to signification, irreducible to signifiers, which poses 
the radical problem of desire. What the Other lacks now is not just 
a signifier…[but] the object. The surplus pairs with the lack, the 
coincidence of two lacks, and this is the way in which the subject, 
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having lost its being in alienation, nevertheless partakes of it in 
separation – through the elusive surplus object one can never get 
hold of (p. 25). 
In review then, we have been introduced to an impossible object, one which 
we may locate at the coincidence of two lacks, an object whose location 
provides us with the pivotal co-ordinates of fantasy. This is not just the case of 
‘a structure of questioning’, a dissymmetrical circuit between two lacks within 
which the vital question of desire is rebounded off an ultimately inconsistent, 
inadequate Other. There is also a return-effect of this questioning, objet a, 
which, when posed in the form of fantasy, holds the promise both of the desire 
of the Other and of the completeness of the subject. This impossible object is 
assumed to hold the key, the answer to the question of subject’s place within 
the social order, and the solution to what would harmonize this social order. It 
is for this reasons that we may think of this non-reciprocal circuit of desire - 
this particular type of questioning and its posited fantasy-object outcome – as 
a fantasmatic transaction. 2 
 
Apartheid and desire 
We can now take up the issue of apartheid ideology, something I propose to 
do via an engagement with J.M. Coetzee’s undervalued paper, ‘The mind of 
apartheid’ (1991). I will evoke what I take to be the key moments in Coetzee’s 
text, intervening within his central argument so as to make the case for the 
necessity of Lacanian psychoanalysis as a mode of critique without which we 
cannot hope to adequately understand the ambiguities and paradoxes of 
apartheid ideology. 
Coetzee begins by distancing himself from a commonplace of apartheid 
historiography - the notion that apartheid can be understood as a rational (if 
not extreme) response to various threats to white privilege. He takes a far 
riskier strategy, posing instead the question of the madness underpinning the 
governmental rationality of apartheid. “If madness has a place in life” he 
insists, “it has a place in history too” (1991, p. 2). The challenge thus posed is 
that of understanding the hold of mad political systems, and more than this, of 
conceptualizing the complex and ambiguous agency of subjects and 
ideologues within such historical periods of madness. 
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The method that Coetzee adopts as a means of pursuing these 
questions is literary: a painstakingly close reading of the sociology of 
segregation and separatism devised by a single apartheid ideologue, Geoffrey 
Cronjé. In what seems an uncharacteristic moment, Coetzee makes 
reference, at the beginning of his essay, to a Freudian diagnostic system, 
labelling Cronjé, “technically” an obsessive.  This is one of two psychoanalytic 
motifs that are immediately present in Coetzee’s analysis of Cronjé’s writings: 
desire and obsessiveness. This desire is not of an obvious sort; it is a form of 
desire that is enacted in relations of repudiation and avoidance, it is made 
apparent in Cronjé’s very “inability to face the desire of black for white or white 
for black”; it “manifests itself in motions of evasion…revulsion and denial” 
(Coetzee, p. 11). Cronjé’s obsessiveness is more immediately evident, a 
compulsive concern with the perils of mixture, racial blood-mixing (rasse-
mengelmoes) punctuate his texts. Coetzee runs these two themes together: 
What Cronjé…repudiates at every turn, is a desire for mixture. 
Around mixture his mind obsessively turns...mixture in its endlessly 
attractive and endlessly repulsive allure… It is mixture and the 
desire for mixture that is the secret enemy of apartheid…the 
baffling force that must be thwarted, imprisoned, shut away (1991, 
p. 3). 
Cronjé’s own analyses never of course address the issue of the unconscious 
desire underlying the production of apartheid ideology. He does however raise 
the question of desire, albeit in an odd sort of way: the question he asks of 
many whites is why there is not a more forceful desire to separate one’s self 
from other races. In other words, he questions the very lack of 
‘apartheidsgevoel’, the absence, in other words, of what he takes to be a 
‘natural’ tendency to segregation within ‘die Afrikanervolk’ (the values and 
history of his cherished white Afrikaaner community). His question thus takes 
the defended form of a double negative, ‘why not the desire not to?’ In 
moments such as this – here Coetzee’s method has something in common 
with that of the analyst - Cronjé’s texts open up into the reverse of their 
intended meaning, implying, beyond Cronjé’s intention, that there exists in fact 
none of the instinctual impulse toward racial segregation that he wishes to 
find. The same seems true of his incessant declaration that as the distance 
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between whites and non-whites diminishes, so “unconsciously a gradual 
process of feeling equal…begins to take place” (cited in Coetzee, p. 11). Such 
a statement, as Coetzee points out, can quite easily be read as an argument 
that interracial tensions can be reduced by social mixing. 
Another apparent absence of desire that Cronjé questions is the void 
he takes to exist at the place where Afrikaner man might desire the black 
woman. This is a lack in which Coetzee reads the force of a particular 
presence, and a particular defensiveness: “the true force here” he remarks “is 
desire, and its counterforce, the denial of desire” (1991, p. 14). Desire may 
also be said to lie at the heart of the problem that apartheid endeavours to 
solve, namely the need voiced by Cronjé to separate “the white man from the 
daily view of the black man”, to thus “ensure that an essentially unattainable 
white culture and lifestyle do not become the object of his envious desire” 
(Coetzee, p. 15). Coetzee rephrases Cronjé’s rationale here, interjecting his 
own contrary suspicions: such segregation will “remove the black man (the 
black woman?) from the view of the white man and thus ensure that he (she?) 
does not become the object of white desire” (p. 15). 
The challenge of apartheid governance for Coetzee then is less the 
control of dissent than the control of desire. Cronjé’s version of apartheid 
develops precisely as a counterattack upon desire. Coetzee is quick to add 
the necessary proviso: one should not ignore apartheid’s origins in greed, just 
as one should not elide the complexities of a multifaceted structural history of 
oppression. Nonetheless: 
the text of apartheid deserves to have restored to it that chapter 
that has been all too smoothly glossed over…removed: a denial 
and a displacement and retrojection of desire re-enacted in further 
huge displaced projects of displacements: the redrawing of the 
maps of cities, the re-division of the countryside, the removal and 
resettling of populations (1991, p. 18). 
 
Phantom agency  
Content that he has made the case for desire in the genealogy of apartheid 
racism, Coetzee turns his attention to what he takes to be a major 
shortcoming of standard apartheid historiography. One of the problems in how 
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apartheid has been committed to history, he insists, lies with the active and 
conscious role that many historians have accorded to those subjects who 
were apartheid’s beneficiaries. This is not simply to make the point that 
apartheid’s beneficiaries were also subjects of the unconscious whose 
involvement in its ideology, and whose rewards for participation therein, often 
exceeded conscious registration. It is also to make a point about the evident 
inadequacy of many historical theorizations of agency. For Coetzee, there is 
something insufficient about how agency is construed in traditional accounts 
of apartheid-as-ideology: 
If the ideologist as [conscious] subject writing the text of ideology is 
one commonplace, the man in the street as the object upon whom 
the text is written, the one made ready to be written on by his 
subjection to fears and prejudices that sweep over communities 
like infections, is another (Coetzee, 1991, p. 28). 
Here we may link Coetzee’s analysis to that of a variety of postcolonial 
theorists – of whom Homi Bhabha (2004) is perhaps the best-known example 
- who have long taken issue with such clear-cut categories of powerful agent 
and acted upon subject. Questions of the authorship of apartheid ideology - 
much like questions of the authorship of fantasy - would seem to require a 
different elaboration of agency to that which Coetzee finds in Structuralist 
approaches to ideology. The analysis of ideology, he argues, aims at 
deciphering, unmasking. “But who did the original ciphering, the original 
masking?” Indeed: 
Does ideology cipher itself, mask itself, unconsciously, or…is 
ideology the creation of a group of people…who appropriate more 
or less inchoate popular notions, put them together in a pseudo-
system, flesh them out with the appropriate rhetoric, and use them 
to further [their] interests? (p. 28) 
Furthermore, is apartheid ideology a “free-floating, parasitic idea-system 
running the minds of its hosts” (p. 30), or is it an idea-system that has been 
consciously constructed, carefully crafted, devised and constantly 
reformulated by apartheid intellectuals? How then might we understand the 
bridging of social and individual realms of ideology, and, furthermore, which of 
these poles should we treat as the pre-eminent or causative category? A 
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series of inter-related problems come to the fore at this point, two of which are 
particularly deserving of systematic treatment. Firstly, the question of the 
primary authorship of apartheid ideology and the associated issue of the 
extraordinary type of authority, indeed, the ‘supra-agency’, that would have to 
underwrite this authorship. Already we may perceive a hint of what Lacan’s 
formulations can offer us in this respect, especially in view of the supra-
agency of the Other as historical social substance. This is an agency that 
exists a level above that of everyday individual subjects and that plays the 
part of coordinating their everyday ideological interactions and presumptions.  
This seems to lead us in the direction, questionable at best, of an apparently 
agent-less agency, of an ideological authorship beyond the level of subjects. 
Secondly, the issue that seems to most vex Coetzee: the problem of 
the ostensibly “extra-ideological” position that the authors of apartheid 
presumably occupy in the process of scripting apartheid ideology. Rather than 
querying a level of agency above that of the subject – i.e. the big Other as 
historical process - we are concerned here with the idea of ideologues able to 
rise above the everyday order of ideological discourse and tinker with its 
constructions.  To clarify: I mean here to signal the awareness on the part of 
such ideologues of their role in the ongoing construction of ideology, in the 
scripting of ideological notions. This seems, on the one hand indisputable. Is 
such an “extra-ideological” position not presumed in the very task of 
fashioning propaganda? Does such a charge not require that one maintain a 
minimal degree of reflexive distance from one’s own discursive productions? 
(There is an interesting implication here: if such subjects are responding to 
the Other’s delegation to produce a systematic ideological representation, 
then surely the greatest truth of this system is its own apparent untruth, the 
fact of its very need for ideologization?). However, as a Žižekian critique of 
such a proclaimed “non-ideological” position would quickly point out, an 
imagined “stepping outside of ideology” is ideology at its most efficient. The 
implication is thus that such authors are themselves caught up in the spell of 
the ideology that they are conjuring. 
These comments make apparent the degree of complexity that will be 
required in addressing questions of ideological agency and authorship, 
especially so, one might add, in situations where subject and Other are not 
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clearly delimited, where a fundamental ambiguity, or apparent overlap, 
characterizes their relationship. Importantly, this state of affairs, the fact of 
such oscillations of agency, the ‘taking of turns’ between subject and Other, 
indicates the need to consider the role of the unconscious, the unconscious 
understood in the Lacanian sense of the subjective locus of the Other. This 
lies at the forefront of what a Lacanian perspective brings to these dilemmas 
of ideology: an appreciation of the implication of subject in Other, and of Other 
in subject, an awareness of the inter-implication of the trans-subjective socio-
historical substance and unconscious subjectivity. Coetzee’s critique of 
apartheid historiography sounds more Lacanian by the moment: not only must 
desire be factored into historical analyses of apartheid, so must the issue of 
the subject-Other relationship, an unconscious relationship which involves the 
subject’s (transferential) positing of what it is the Other wants. 
What is called for then is an account able to understand how subjects 
are active as agents in an authorial ideological process which nonetheless at 
times over-rides them. This switching back between moments when the 
subject is spoken by the Other and when they voice their own fantasmatic 
objectives that nevertheless remain conditioned by the Other’s presumed 
desire (as in Cronjé’s own idiosyncratic apartheid visions), suggests that we 
are not far removed from the processes of alienation and separation. There is 
here something which resembles the circuit of questioning discussed above, 
namely the relentless (‘Che vuoi?’) recourse to what the Other wants as 
means of deciding issues of desire and of the order of an ideal, harmonious 
society. Lacan’s concepts give us a degree of subtlety in how we go about 
understanding this to and fro movement where alienation in the Other gives 
way to a kind of momentary separation (firstly), and the associated 
emergence of fantasmatic objects and projects that in turn collapses back into 
alienation (secondly).  
 
Is the big Other racist? 
The predictable poststructuralist riposte to this situation of “stepping outside of 
ideology” is that we have overstated the agency of the ideologue, of the 
author. This entanglement of types of agency (subject and Other) has, 
seemingly, resulted from just such an error. We should start our analysis – 
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following this line of critique - with neither the intention of the author nor with 
the assumption that they are able to transcend the discursive systems of 
which they are a part.  At this point however another question emerges which 
threatens the ascendancy of accounts which stress the de-subjectified and 
determining role of societal structure, institutions, discourse and so on. Are we 
dealing with a self-perpetuating system that proliferates simply for the purpose 
of extending itself, a case of a discourse whose predominant goal, to quote 
Edward Said is "to maintain itself…to manufacture its material continually" 
(1983, p. 216)? Is this what we need to apprehend, the equivalent of an 
ideological virus, a parasite that attaches itself to a society of subjects, certain 
of whom, for a limited time, act as its privileged points of articulation?  
This is not an idea that can be simply dismissed: the combined 
momentum of historical, institutional and material relations of force certainly 
makes for a significant consideration in understanding the longevity of 
ideology. Nevertheless, such a phantom agency seems curiously devoid of 
human passions. The risk taken in pursuing such a line of analysis is that the 
factors of desire, irrationality and enjoyment are elided within accounts of 
historical change. Removing passionate human subjects from the equation 
leads us to ask a naïve question: why would the Other – in and of itself – 
continue to insist on racist ideology?  
There is another problem with collapsing accountability into the 
category of the Other, one which will help us identify a potential misapplication 
of Lacanian theory. Mobilizing the notion of the Other of apartheid most 
certainly does not allow us to summarily conclude that the big Other is 
responsible for setting in motion the machinery of apartheid, true as it may 
have been that the historical trans-subjective order of white, colonial, pre-
apartheid South Africa was indeed racist. Here, as elsewhere, it is imperative 
to reiterate that the Other retains the transferential status of presumption. As 
Žižek (1996) reminds us, the Other is posited, ‘virtualized’ by subjects 
precisely as a means of making sense of an opaque set of social relations; it 
is an operational hypothesis which enables the communicative and ideological 
coherence of a world they co-inhabit. Clearly then the Other cannot be made 
the patsy for apartheid, just as it cannot be fully divorced from the subjects 
who transmit and duplicate its values, subjects who remain thoroughly 
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implicated in the ideological universe thus extended. To reiterate the fact of 
the unconscious dimension touched on above: we are not dealing with the big 
Other as simply the objective factuality of the trans-subjective social structure. 
Insofar as we factor the unconscious into our analyses we are concerned also 
with the subjective locus of the Other. In applying the Other as an analytical 
tool we cannot separate it out from the realm of the subject-Other relationship, 
which is of course inclusive of the associated processes of alienation and 
separation.  
To be sure then: the Other is reducible neither to the intra-personal nor 
to the societal; it is a function neither simply of the ‘internal’ nor the ‘external’, 
it is, by contrast, the mediator between these two aspects. My point is clear 
enough: the Other provides no trump-card in claims of non-accountability for 
racism, even though it certainly does add a new level of sophistication to 
questions of ideological agency as an analytical category that resists 
reduction to either the psychical or the structural. What this means then is that 
we can concede a type of supra-agency (the trans-subjectivity of historical, 
structural, societal conditions) as a paramount consideration - one which at 
times certainly does over-run or ’determine’ certain utterances/actions of the 
subject - without accepting that it wholly exhausts their subjectivity. It is 
precisely in view of this latter consideration that the crucial distinction between 
alienation and separation comes into play. 
Two further clarifications need to be made here as a means of 
expanding our understanding of the role of fantasy and desire, and indeed, of 
accountability and subjectivization, in the subject-Other relation. The first 
involves the introduction of a new analytical concept, the notion of enjoyment, 
that is, the affective intensity of the illicit libidinal gratification of jouissance. 
Such ‘subterranean’ modes of pleasure-pain elude the grasp of language; 
they cannot be easily factored into everyday categories of pleasure. However, 
despite this elusiveness, the subject for psychoanalysis remains 
fundamentally accountable for their jouissance. Now, to be sure, the 
theorization of alienation discussed above makes it clear that the subject is 
frequently ‘over-written’, determined by the symbolic structure such that their 
every attempt at speaking remains radically contingent on the expressive 
tools, the signifiers of their given discursive and historical ‘grounds of 
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speaking’. Nevertheless - and here we have a clinical pragmatic insisted upon 
already by Freud - the subject remains utterly responsible for their jouissance. 
Zupančič (2000) makes a useful adjoining point: despite Lacan’s ‘de-
psychologizing of the subject’, that is, his repeated emphasis on the alienation 
of the signifier, he nevertheless insists on an irreducible element of jouissance 
as the ‘proof of the subject’s existence’. What this means then, returning to 
the concerns of our above discussion, is that the subjects in question remain 
accountable for each element of transgressive enjoyment they experience, be 
it by means of the ‘pleasures’ of racism or by means of the narcissistic 
“superiority” of exclusionary Afrikanervolk identifications. (Interestingly, 
Cronjé’s very use of the term ‘apartheidsgevoel’ (apartheid-feeling) appears to 
betray this fact, that the longevity of apartheid required not just a set of 
obvious libidinal investments, but a certain operation of jouissance, a 
particular ordering of enjoyment).  
A second important clarification to the argument offered thus far 
concerns the difference between the desire of the Other and the ‘individuated’ 
status of the subject’s fantasy. This is a distinction which returns us to the 
earlier differentiation between the alienated reproduction of signifiers within 
the field of the Other (firstly), and the fantasy-productions enabled by 
separation and supported by given modes of jouissance (secondly). We are, 
in other words, returned to the dissymmetrical circuit of questioning that I have 
elaborated above as a fantasmatic transaction. Important to grasp here is the 
fact that Fantasy is a means of response, the return-effect produced within 
this circuit by the subject as a means of dealing with the enigma of the Other’s 
desire.  This is the paradoxical aspect of fantasy that psychoanalysis helps us 
understand: fantasy is both that which lies at the very core of our subjectivity – 
it is that which more than anything else constitutes what is irreducible about 
us - despite that it cannot ever be fully separated from the field of the Other. 
How do we make sense of this paradox? By making it clear that fantasy is 
thus both in a sense autonomous – it is the invention of the subject, their 
unconscious response to the enigma of the Other’s desire – and yet it is 
nevertheless contingent on the Other inasmuch as it is a kind of working 
hypothesis – and a libidinally-loaded one at that, charged with certain modes 
and promises of jouissance - to the question of the Other’s desire. In short, 
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fantasy does not emerge outside of the parameters of this deadlock of the 
Other’s desire, it is always an answer, a fantasmatic solution, to precisely this 
lack; as such fantasy remains dependent on the Other. At the same time, 
fantasy can never be reduced to the Other, it is of the subject; the Other does 
not generate fantasies, as Salecl (1998) notes, any more than it enjoys, 
partakes of jouissance. 
This is the importance of the above two clarifications: both the 
accountability of jouissance and fact of fantasy as invention of the subject 
demonstrate that the subject does attain a degree, no matter how fleeting or 
transient, of subjective ‘individuation’ (or, more appropriately, separation).  
Further evidence then that racism cannot be the sole preserve of the Other, 
that it must, by contrast, be viewed as a negotiated transaction of desire 
between the subject and the Other.  
 
The rewards of fantasy 
My argument thus far has been to suggest that it is with recourse to the 
complexities of the subject-Other relationship described above that we may 
better understand certain of the ambiguities and paradoxes of ideological 
agency in apartheid. The twin processes of alienation and separation appear 
to offer an answer to whether ideologues are able to stand outside the frame 
of their ideological world. The answer, it would seem, is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. 
‘No’ inasmuch as such subjects are thoroughly alienated in the Other whose 
socio-symbolic and historical substance they play their part in extending. ‘Yes’ 
inasmuch as separation allows them a degree of suspension from alienation, 
even if their individual fantasies are nonetheless fashioned as responses to 
the Other’s desire, and done so within the parameters of certain fundamental 
questions (“What is it that the Other lacks?, “How might I repair this lack?”, 
“What is my role and function here?”, “What is missing in my society, how 
might it be restored, made complete?”) 
I wish now to turn to a third set of questions raised by Coetzee in his 
interrogation of apartheid historiography, that is, to the central issue of what, 
aside from the imperatives of Capital, propelled the ideological system of 
apartheid for so long? Given that apartheid occurred in the direction of certain 
interests, not all of which should be seen as material or even rational, then 
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what was the nature of its less than tangible, less than rational rewards? The 
identity of apartheid’s beneficiaries seems clear-cut enough: all aspects of 
white South African society profited from apartheid. This much would appear 
beyond contention, although one should add the obvious qualification: the 
transactions of reward involved were not only conscious, but also, crucially, 
unconscious in nature. What Coetzee intimates is that we may need take 
account of a set of intangible rewards, types of interest – or, as we might add, 
modes of enjoyment - that not only eclipse the terms of clear-cut financial or 
symbolic gain, but that entirely exceed everyday categories of benefit. 
Up until this point we have pin-pointed three inadequacies in standard 
apartheid historiography: the absence of an analytics of desire; the omission 
of any adequate discussion of the unconscious dimension of the subject-
Other relation; and the neglect of the factor of certain non-material rewards. 
There is however one further issue that needs to be taken into account before 
turning our attention to an understanding of the evasive and intangible 
rewards underlying the intransigence of apartheid ideology. What we have 
been confronted with is not only a series of paradoxes of ideological agency 
within the context of a mad political system, we have also the challenge of 
explaining the particular obduracy of ‘race’ within this and similar systems. 
Part of our task is to understand this potent category of division, this Master-
signifier, whose force is not adequately apprehended as a discursive artifact, 
a signifying construction. 
Obviously, there are - and have been - many ways one might go about 
tracing the discursive deployment of ‘race’ as a constructed notion. A great 
variety of historical trajectories can be offered as means of tracking the use 
and growth of this notion as a particularly virulent signifier within the confines 
of colonial power. It seems to me however, by virtue of the ‘constructedness’ 
of race in such explanations, that one is obliged to go further, and to offer an 
account of something else, at a different ontological level, of what brings 
about or necessitates this construction in the first place. The ‘constructedness’ 
of race, in other words, should not represent the limit of our critical horizons, 
nor should it be the lesson we continually re-articulate. Another analytical 
priority thus takes precedence, one that can be expressed as a question: what 
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underlying process gives race its particular density and inescapability in the 
colonial sphere?  
Implicit in these comments is a charge against the notion that ‘race’ 
can simply and summarily be deconstructed, ‘re-signified’. Equally evident is 
my sense of dissatisfaction with the idea that critical analysis is served merely 
by linking ‘race’ to ever more constructions within a broadening textual field.  
There is an obvious point to be made here about the limits of the socially-
constructed world, about those analytical approaches which restrict their 
critique to such explanatory presumptions, and, indeed, about the role of 
psychoanalytic explanation in extending such an order of explanation. What is 
being neglected in such historicist-discursive accounts is the fact that race is 
bound up in an economy of fantasmatic values and identifications, in the 
pursuit of particular enjoyments and rewards.  
One response to the question of what continued to propel the 
ideological system of apartheid - aside from the obvious incentives of capital – 
is to be found in the idea of the rewards of ideology itself. The first intuition to 
this effect that Coetzee (1991) finds in the literature - much of which he finds 
wanting in this respect - is Marks & Trapido’s (1987) speculation regarding the 
gains of certain “ideological rewards”. Coetzee initially treats this answer with 
a degree of skepticism; surely the notion of an ideological reward is a 
contradiction in terms, especially so if ‘reward’ must ultimately be traced back 
to a material incentive of sorts? Do we not risk giving an answer here (of 
“ideological rewards”) that merely restates the subject of the question 
(ideology)? If we consider ideology as a system of representations 
engendered to conceal the inequitable “rewards” of various social 
contradictions, then surely it is not a reward itself, but precisely a means to 
such ends, a means that is to say of assuring and protecting a regime of 
material benefits?  
If ideology is not just a means to an end, but is in some ways an end in 
itself, if it engenders its own intrinsic rewards outside the frame of material 
gains, then what might be an example of such an intrinsic ideological reward? 
The psychical benefits of racist ideology are easy enough to imagine; we 
might take as a case in point the narcissistic gain implied by the reiteration of 
one’s own supposed superiority, the consolidation of an imaginary identity or 
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community. Here we are but a step away from Coetzee’s (1991) insight, 
namely that such ideological rewards might be said to fulfill certain 
fantasmatic functions. This is the closest Coetzee feels he comes to a 
satisfying answer regards the non-material rewards of apartheid ideology - 
although, regrettably it is one he leaves largely undeveloped – namely the 
notion of what he terms the “phantasmatic reward” (1991, p. 29). As in the 
case of apartheid’s preoccupation with racial purity – Marks & Trapido (1987) 
cite the massive importance that apartheid’s legislators accorded to the 
Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts – such ideological rewards were not 
those of material benefit but those of a very different type of possession: that 
of a particular fantasmatic identity (in this case, of white racial or ethnic 
Afrikaner purity).  
The elaboration and protection of such a fantasmatic possession is 
painfully apparent in Cronjé’s writing, much of which is concerned with the 
shoring-up of the fantasmatic identity of the Afrikaanervolk which he treats as 
far more precious than any material costs that may be incurred in ensuring its 
protection. What is equally apparent here is the extent to which such 
fantasmatic properties - or indeed, modes of enjoyment – are typically posed 
alongside equally fantasmatic threats. Cronjé’s sublime object of the 
Afrikaanervolk exists always alongside the perils of racial blood-mixing (rasse-
mengelmoes). We have thus a confirmation of Žižek’s (1997) assertion that 
any given fantasy is divided between its beatific, stabilizing aspect (the 
promise, say, of absolute white racial purity/superiority) and its vexing, 
radically destabilizing aspect which forms the basis of a variety of 
exaggerated threats (for Cronjé, the contaminant of blackness, or, 
metonymically, the danger of infection by black blood). The dynamic interplay 
of these aspects should not be lost on us: the beatific dimension of fantasy 
functions to mask a structural impossibility (a pure, independent Afrikaner 
community existing in a state of self-contained harmony), whereas the second 
dimension provides the reason - and typically also a scapegoat - for why such 
an inherent impossibility could not be realized. 
Coetzee goes on to query whether Marks & Trapido (1978), who 
supplied the notion of the ‘ideological rewards’, might not be read as 
suggesting that the electorate and the legislators alike of the crucial 1948 
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election that ushered in the apartheid state were caught in a “phantasmatic 
transaction” (1991, p. 29). Unfortunately, he veers off from the intriguing 
psychoanalytic implications such an answer affords, although he does 
approvingly suggest that in this depiction “no rigid line is drawn between the 
constructors of the ideology, and those who misperceive the world through the 
lens it provides” (1991, p. 29). The postulate of such fantasmatic transactions 
helps to muddy the notions that apartheid intellectuals were, to paraphrase 
Coetzee, the exclusive and conscious authors of this ideology, that apartheid 
ideology was merely the text written by them, and that the man in the street 
was the object upon which this text was written. We have a threefold 
disruption thus of who authored apartheid (the active role of ideologues 
understood in the light of a circuit of questioning of the Other’s desire), the 
nature of its ideology (which is thus more than merely textual) and the type of 
subjectification thus involved (fantasmatic subjectivation, that is, the active 
subjective production of fantasies, not merely subjects as structurally-
determined). Likewise, the idea of fantasmatic transactions, especially once 
linked to the processes of the subject-Other relation described above, help us 
understand how apartheid ideology may have been both the “free-floating, 
parasitic idea-system running the minds of its hosts” (Coetzee, 1991, p. 30) 
and an idea system consciously constructed by apartheid intellectuals. 
The structure of questioning I have described above involves a circuit 
joining two lacks within which the vital question of desire is posed to an 
enigmatic Other. This questioning, to reiterate, yields a return-effect, a 
response on the part of the subject in the form of a sublime object of fantasy 
which holds the promise of a kind of harmony or completeness, be it of an 
individual’s social role, or of the key meaning of an apparent societal impasse. 
We understand then why the naïve question of causality as to which is the 
pre-eminent category, the apparent ‘individual’ or ‘social’ dimensions of 
ideology, returns an answer of circularity. What do I mean by this? I mean to 
say yes, apartheid is a parasitic idea-system that is embodied in the Other, 
that comes before and over-rides its ideologues (the operation of alienation), 
at least in the sense that fantasy always emerges via a transaction with the 
Other’s presumed desire.  However apartheid is also an idea-system put 
together by its ideologues. As in the process of separation, we are dealing 
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with a fantasmatic response to the enigma of the Other’s desire, which is the 
invention of the subject, a function of their agency – an agency of fantasy and 
jouissance alike – that such subjects remain accountable for. 3 
 
Conclusion 
The motivating objectives behind this paper are by now, I hope, demonstrably 
apparent. I have aimed to add nuance and depth to the notion of a 
fantasmatic transaction, to take the promising start offered by Coetzee and 
link it to a series of Lacanian postulates. Doing so has opened an interesting 
perspective not only on the tenacious hold of ‘mad’ ideological systems and 
on the ties that bind subjects to Others during such historical periods, but also 
on the complicated patterns of authorship, agency and causality thus entailed. 
I have tried to show that there remains something irreducibly singular about 
the final, individualized realization of fantasies despite that they take shape 
within apparently formulaic socio-historical parameters. This is crucial in 
grappling with Cronjé’s writings and his role as ideologue, and a point worth 
reiterating: fantasies are the return-effect resulting from the attempted 
separation of the subject from the Other, as such they bear the imprint of a 
kind of individuation even while they can never be said to be wholly 
independent of the Other. So, the fantasies that Coetzee is concerned with 
may be original, characterized by innovative components, unique 
arrangements and contents, without its authors having the ability to stand 
completely outside the contextualizing domain of the Other. Generic, 
stereotypical parameters of racist fantasy co-exist here alongside the 
individualized details and texture of its particularized realization, indeed, 
alongside the distinctive modes of its subjectivized enjoyment in unique 
subjects. Within this relation, this particularly Lacanian articulation of fantasy 
and desire, we have the germs of an account that can simultaneously contain 
a non-reductive subjectivity and – paradoxically – the role of a ‘determining’ 
Other. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis provides a series of concepts that may be 
profitably applied in illuminating the fantasmatic functioning of apartheid 
ideology. Many of these concepts I have barely touched on: the enjoyment 
(jouissance) entailed in the pursuit of the sublime object, and the related idea 
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that the Other requires the constant influx of jouissance of those who 
constitute it (Žižek, 1992); the role of castration as apparent in the interplay 
between stabilizing and destabilizing elements of fantasy (the surplus of what 
could be relative to what has been taken away); the functioning of a 
prospective master-signifier (S1), (say, ‘Afrikaanervolk’) which positivizes a 
lack, and sets in play an unending chain of signifiers or knowledge (S2), hence 
transforming an empty place of meaning into a nodal-point of ideology. By 
contrast, I have opted to focus on a different and less evoked aspect of the 
Lacanian account of fantasy, namely the processes of alienation and 
separation as they occur within the dissymmetric circuit – or transaction – of 
fantasmatic desire. The reasons for this are, I hope, by now evident. For a 
start, it brings into sharp relief the driving force of desire, and the need to 
trace desire as a key analytical consideration in the analysis of power. 
Secondly, such an approach places the subject-Other relation centre-stage, 
something which enables us not only to flag-up the unconscious dimension of 
ideological processes (the unconscious here as “the subjective locus of the 
Other”), but also to throw light on a number of the paradoxes of agency and 
causality evidenced within the vacillating relation between subject and the 
Other.  
Discussion of these processes adds new complexity to a series of 
vexing dilemmas of ideology; it disrupts the constraining categories of acted 
upon subjects, ideology as text, and ideologues as conscious authorial agents 
not themselves subject to the parasitic hold of the idea-system they play their 
part in constructing. Not only does recourse to the processes of alienation and 
separation help collapse many of these simplistic distinctions, it also does 
greater conceptual justice to the inter-implication of Other and subject, that is, 
to the inter-implication of the trans-subjective socio-historical substance and 
unconscious subjectivity.  
The Lacanian concepts utilized here make a unique contribution to the 
understanding of apartheid racism. The fact that a fantasmatic transaction of 
sorts may underlie the workings of racist ideology is here absolutely crucial, 
the idea, in other words, of the unconscious subject-Other relationship, and of 
fantasy as the form of mediation that joins (or overlaps) these two positions of 
lack. This lies at the heart of the originality of the Lacanian contribution: the 
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notion that this mediation of lacks is made manageable, ‘domesticated’ by the 
provision of objet a and an according fantasy-frame. These two issues, the 
potent ideological question of what the trans-subjective socio-historical 
substance wants and the vehicle of fantasy which provides a variety of 
responses to this question of desire, prove absolutely imperative in 
understanding the many paradoxes underlying the historical insistence of 
apartheid racism. More succinctly put, these factors are of paramount 
importance if we are to grasp the peculiar economy of fantasy as it functions 
within racist ideology, in the ‘mind of apartheid’.   
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1 As I hope is obvious, just as Lacan’s theory of the processes of alienation/separation is not 
to be confused with Marxist or Existentialist notions of alienation, or indeed with any 
psychological theories of separation (developmental theories, notions of separation-anxiety, 
attachment, etc.) By contrast, we are here concerned with an unconscious dimension of 
subject-Other relationship, with one aspect of the inter-implication of the trans-subjective 
socio-historical substance and unconscious subjectivity.  
 
2 It is worth making mention of two attempts to extend Lacan’s alienation/separation 
distinction. Dolar (1998) makes the promising observation that this opposition can be read “as 
an elaboration of the difference between metaphor and metonymy” (p. 24). Jacques-Alain 
Miller (2007) speaks of how alienation “foregrounds the subject of the signifier, just as 
separation foregrounds the subject of jouissance” (p. 61). He also emphasizes the two 
different modes of identification thus implied: identification by means of representation 
(alienation), identification with the object (separation). In separation we cannot say that the 
subject is represented, by contrast: 
All…we can say of the subject [of separation] is that it is little a. The subject 
asserts itself as object a. The positivization we have here with little a comes from 
the use that the subject makes of its own lack as subject of the signifier, by fitting 




                                                                                                                             
3  The paradoxical time of separation supports this assertion of the circular time of ideology as 
manifest in the subject-Other relation, certainly so inasmuch as it involves an overlapping of 
future and past. Regards the subject’s attempt to move beyond the inescapable determination 
of the symbolic Lacan (1979) makes reference to the ‘future anterior’, that is, the future past 
tense of ‘I will have already been’. 
